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ABSTRACT 
 
An Exploratory Analysis of the Psychological Dimensions of Airline Security and Correlates of 
Perceived Terrorism Threats: A Study of Active American Airlines Pilots 
 
by 
Paul M. Borowsky 
 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack resulted in a myriad of new policies designed to 
enhance aviation security.  These policies ostensibly considered the origins of the exact threat 
facing the United States.  Missing, however, were the inputs from rank and file pilots of the 
airlines that policy makers were attempting to protect.  This exploratory study distributed a 50- 
question survey designed to measure pilot perceptions of security risk and threats.  Univariate 
descriptives were used to examine the extent to which sample data approximated the population 
of interest. Factor and reliability analysis were used to document the multidimensionality of the 
constructs and assess the appropriateness of the linear combination of variables used to construct 
the scales. Finally, correlation analysis was used to better understand which areas of airline 
security might be targeted by policymakers to enhance existing structures and practices.  Results 
revealed statistically significant differences in the perceptions of pilot security concerns and the 
focus of current U.S. aviation security policy.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001, will be remembered as a day of violent and malicious terrorist 
attacks against U.S. citizens and interests in a nonwar zone. Officially, 2,996 people were 
confirmed dead or missing. Shortly thereafter, U.S. foreign policy was dramatically redefined as 
well as political priorities, economic strategies, and U.S. connections with international allies. At 
an individual level, the unprecedented tragedy may have affected U.S. citizens and their 
perceptions of the future as well as expectations of daily life. Soon after 9/11 it was clear that 
Americans were forever changed as a result of the attacks (Peterson & Seligman, 2003, p. 381). 
America had been dramatically exposed to a form of warfare known as terrorism and, although 
far from a new concept, it was the first time Americans had been exposed to it on such a large 
scale. The issue facing Americans now became one of providing for security while preserving 
individual liberty. More specifically, new policies and strategies would have to be formulated in 
order to provide a safer, more secure, and more reliable air transportation system. 
Following the attacks of 9/11 the United States Congress established the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, more commonly known as the 9/11 
Commission. Its purpose was: 
to investigate facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, including those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, 
diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist 
organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource 
allocations, and other areas deemed relevant by the Commission. (The 9/11 Commission, 
2004, p. xv) 
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The Commission report was designed to determine the location of weak areas, or fault lines, in 
security policy and practices. It was assembled because “September 11, 2001 was a day of 
unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States, a traumatic event, 
therefore giving rise to great anxiety about judgment and the assignment of blame” (The 9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. xv). The Commission directly criticized the Federal Aviation 
Administration, whose staff informed them that is was not their responsibility to tell airlines 
what to tell pilots regarding security crisis on planes (Young, 2007, p. 35).  The FAA did not feel 
it was their responsibility to warn airlines or pilots of potential terrorist threats. 
Many of these policies changed when President George H. W. Bush signed into law the 
Air Transportation Security Act that was designed to improve the nation’s aviation security 
system. The Act intended to change the way security is performed and administered for the entire 
transportation industry. The Act contained specific deadlines for its new administrators such as 
mandating a massive hiring of over 30,000 new screeners to occupy over 400 airports nationwide 
(Sweet, 2004, p. 43). Clearly screening was a prominent early target of policymakers in the 
defense of the nation’s airlines. Policy makers, however, never consulted with rank and file 
pilots at American Airlines during any phase of post 9/11 aviation security policy formation. 
Airline pilots are charged with the safe operation of multimillion dollar aircraft as well as 
the lives of potentially hundreds of passengers on each flight. They fly up to 100 hours per 
month, or 1,000 hours per year, while being subjected to various security processes at major 
airports around the world. They observe ramp operations and security screening as well as 
coordinate in-flight security with flight attendants and air marshals. The perceptions and intimate 
local knowledge these pilots possess could help shape more effective airline security policy; 
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however, no significant study has been found highlighting this valuable, unexplored area of 
expertise. Understanding the perceptions of pilots and their observations of aviation security 
could lead to more effective policy, which in turn could lead to a safer, more effective air 
transportation system. 
The objective of this exploratory study is to quantitatively measure the above mentioned 
security perceptions of risks and threats that currently challenge post-9/11 aviation security as 
perceived by pilots of American Airlines. Current U.S. policy has primarily focused on 
passenger screening as the principal deterrent and last line of defense in keeping terrorists from 
boarding commercial aircraft.  The focus on screening, however, may be to the detriment of 
other dimensions of airline security.  The intimate local knowledge of rank and file pilots of 
American Airlines may reveal dimensions that have been overlooked by U.S. aviation security 
policymakers.   
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITURATURE 
Defining the Enemy 
The ancient Chinese warrior Sun Tzu taught his men to know their enemy before going into 
battle. For if “you know your enemy and know yourself,” he wrote, “you need not fear the result 
of a hundred battles.” However, Sun Tzu warned, “If you know yourself but not the enemy, for 
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat” (North, 2004, p. 1).  The ancient words of Sun 
Tzu, written over 2,500 years ago, are as relevant now as they were then.  
Following the events of 9/11 the nation’s airline pilots were asking themselves who or 
what the enemy was. Just 9 days later President George Bush attempted to answer that question 
during a speech to the joint session of Congress. “Americans have many questions tonight,” he 
said. “Americans are asking who attacked our country. The evidence we have gathered all points 
to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qa’ida.” He went on to 
say that al- Qa’ida practices “a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.” 
He further added that the “terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill 
all Americans and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and 
children” (As cited in Rubin & Rubin, pp. 321-322).  
President Bush seemed very cautious to define the enemy as not Islam itself, but as a 
radical offshoot of the religion that uses and perverts Islam to justify its methods for achieving its 
goals. To further distance the terrorists from mainstream Islam he added the following:  
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your 
faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in 
countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those 
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who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah (As cited in Rubin & 
Rubin, pp. 322-323). 
He further added that the  
terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy 
of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy 
is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them (As cited in 
Rubin & Rubin, pp. 322-323).  
It is apparent great lengths were taken to define the enemy, and that definition would be used to 
formulate new policies and strategies to help counteract any future acts of terrorism—especially 
as it pertained to the commercial air transportation system.  
Suicide bombing, however, is not a new phenomenon. It has been observed for well over 
25 years, and has emerged as a defining characteristic of modern day terrorism. Since the early 
1980s, the use of suicide bombing by terrorists and insurgent groups has grown exponentially. In 
2004, suicide bombers carried out 163 attacks, striking targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Israel, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. The final count for 2005 was approximately 360 suicide 
bombings causing 3,000 fatalities (Lewis, 2007, p. 223). Furthermore, according to the U.S. 
Department of State, in 2005, suicide bombings worldwide accounted for 20% of all casualties, 
despite representing only 3.2% of all terrorist attacks. (As cited in Lewis, 2007) 
The attraction of suicide bombings stems from their effectiveness. Judged in terms of 
lethality and media exposure, suicide bombing is the best way for terrorists to carry out lethal 
violence. Additionally, suicide attacks are relatively inexpensive, as long as the attacker’s life is 
deemed a reasonable price to pay. For these reasons, suicide bombing has become the weapon of 
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choice for organizations that wish to level the military playing field between themselves and 
their better armed enemies. (Lewis, 2007) 
On November 27, 2002, the Congress and President created The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Commission was made up of 10 bipartisan 
members with the sole purpose of determining why the nation was unprepared for the attacks, 
how they happened, and what could be done to prevent any future occurrences (The 9/11 
Commission, 2004). The Commission report was thorough in its findings and recommendations, 
and further defined that: 
Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror, nor does Islam teach terror. 
American and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam, not the great world faith itself. 
Lives guided by religious faith, including literal beliefs in Holy Scriptures, and common 
to every religion, and represent no threat to us (The 9/11 Commission, 2004, p.363).  
Instead, the commission pointed to a “lack of imagination within the security and policy 
communities as the most significant failure” (As cited in Lewis, p. 226). One explanation for the 
United States’ vulnerability to suicide hijackings was due to U.S. intelligence’s community 
inability to imagine passenger airliners being used as weapons despite the fact that al-Qa’ida had 
already made use of suicide bombers for its most visible attacks (Lewis, 2007). 
With the findings of the 9/11 Commission report the reorganization of the government to 
assist U.S. Counterterrorism policy could be further refined. At that point, the enemy had been 
clearly defined and recommendations were given to prevent any further terrorist acts. On March 
16, 2006, President Bush released his second term National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS 
explains how the government is “working to protect the American people, advance American 
interests, enhance global security, and expand global liberty and prosperity” (Bush, 2006, p. 3).  
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The NSS again reiterates that “while the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of 
religions,” and that “transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion of 
Islam to serve a violent political vision” (Bush, p. 5). 
Terrorism has many historical dimensions not seen in more common crimes. Events 
occurring decades or even centuries ago can influence events in the present. More recent events 
such as the invasion of Iraq result in connecting the past to the present in a constant stream of 
terrorist events intended to serve some wider strategy. Muslim terrorists use this historical 
perspective to restore their society to the ideal of a past perfect or transform their existing society 
to meet some timeless ideal (Roach, Ekblom, & Flynn, 2005, p. 9). 
Interestingly, terrorists do not perceive themselves as acting criminally. From their point 
of view, their behavior is as rational as any other. This rationality, however, may exist more at a 
group rather than individual level, some of whom may be deliberately psychologically 
conditioned (Roach et al, 2005). Theorists speculate that potential terrorists are conditioned by 
the following process: 
Socialization. Potential terrorists are introduced to the values and attitudes of the existing 
terror group. Through a process of socialization they begin to take on those values and 
attitudes. 
Moral disengagement. This process reorders the existing moral codes of conventional 
behavior. It reduces the terrorist’s part in any death and destruction psychologically by 
misrepresenting the harm done and blaming (or dehumanizing) the victims (akin to the 
process where offenders ‘neutralize any feelings of guilt and remorse for their victims). 
Attachment. Having achieved socialization and moral disengagement, the individuals 
becomes psychologically attached to the terrorist group, which now gives meaning to 
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their lives (especially where there is a religious overlay). The individual then finds it 
impossible to leave the group – such withdrawal simply cannot be contemplated (Roach 
et al., 2005, p. 11). 
The importance of knowing your enemy is vital to U.S. interests. A great deal of current 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been formulated based on the threat of rogue Islamist 
terrorists and not the religion of Islam itself. But what if religion is the root cause of extremism 
and dysfunctional behavior that clearly permeates modern Middle Eastern culture? Effective 
policy and strategy is dependent on a clear understanding of who or what the United States is 
fighting. If Islam is to blame than the question still remains whether or not current U.S. policy is 
based on an adequate analytical understanding of Islam and Islamist Terrorism. Moreover, have 
policy makers considered Islam as a contributing factor when creating and implementing 
strategy? 
It is difficult to imagine the current level of Middle Eastern conflict existing today 
without Islam as the core value system and fundamental identity of the Middle Eastern people. 
Simply put, without Islam there would be no Islamist Terrorism. Current U.S. policy makers 
should be intimately familiar where ideological seeds are planted and how they continually 
influence global terrorism. Without this knowledge a clear understanding of the enemy cannot be 
ascertained and counterterrorism policy would be detrimentally affected. 
A brief historical overview illustrates how fast the enemy goes from a simple group of 
miscreants to a far more complex group of radical religious fundamentalists whose source of 
violent ideological philosophies come from the religion of Islam itself. It should be noted that 
unlike western religion and society, particularly Christianity in America, Islam is an all 
encompassing way of life. It believes in the absence of separation between any earthly 
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institutions and the religion itself. Thus, politics, government, law and education are institutions 
guided and influenced by the teachings of Islam (Rubin & Rubin, 2002).   
Modern Islamist terrorist ideology traces its roots to 1920s Egypt with the founding of the 
Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood is still in existence today, and finds 
its doctrines and beliefs in all modern Islamist terrorist organizations. Because of this, it is 
incumbent on U.S. policy makers to understand the philosophy and teachings of this 
organization, why it found an audience, and what can be done to moderate it radical and harmful 
beliefs. 
The brotherhood believes Islam “applies to all nations and all people.” Furthermore, in 
order to advance their dogmatic vision of a unified return to the so-called glory days of Islam, 
they label any government that fails to share their vision as unworthy of leadership. Additionally, 
they feel it is their responsibility to replace, through force if necessary, those governments 
(Rubin & Rubin, p. 27). This view is central to all modern Islamist organizations. They see 
themselves as liberators of sorts and desire to overthrow existing governments and install a pure 
Islamic state in order to rid themselves of the corruption and western influence that has 
supposedly hindered their nations from achieving greatness. Once this is complete, the state can 
exist as it was originally intended by Islam. The Brotherhood believes it is the individual’s 
responsibility to questions any government’s policies if they do not live up to the standards of 
Islam as they interpret them. Al-Banna warned that any government that could not deliver, in 
short order, would need to be replaced, and this “would inevitably lead to a revolution” (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2002). 
With the Brotherhood the seeds of modern revolution were borne in the name of Islam. 
The idea of the path for Islam to reclaim its position of dominance and influence that can only be 
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achieved by a revolutionary return to a pure state is at the center of conflict in the Islamic world. 
Some believe in moderation, while others support violent revolution to achieve results. It is the 
latter (found in the teachings and doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood) that the U.S. is now 
confronting; and that continues to spread its violent and disruptive ideology throughout the world 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2002). 
Eventually the teachings of Hassan al-Banna influenced an Islamic theorist named Sayyid 
Qutb, who continued to refine and define the call for radicalism. And like al-Banna, his views 
are represented today in all Islamist fundamentalist groups. For those who believe in a policy of 
isolation from Islamic states in order to appease fundamentalists, than consider the words of 
Qutb, written in 1955: 
Some enemies of Islam may consider it expedient not to take any action against Islam, if 
Islam leaves them alone in their geographical boundaries…But Islam cannot agree to this 
unless they submit to its authority by paying jizya [a tax paid to Muslims by non-
Muslims], which will be a guarantee that they have opened their doors for Islam and will 
not put any obstacles in its propagation through the power of the state…. (As cited in 
Rubin & Rubin, p. 32). 
 The Brotherhood’s teachings have found an audience with similar minded reactionaries, 
some of whom would have a profound influence in future world events. One of those 
reactionaries was Ayatolla Ruhollah Khomeini, who in 1942 said the following:  
Those who know nothing of Islam counsel against war. Those [who say this] are witless. 
Islam says: Kill all the unbelievers just as they would kill you all!...Islam says: Kill them 
[the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter [their armies]…Islam says: Kill in 
the service of Allah those who may want to kill you!...Whatever good there is exists 
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thanks to the sword and the shadow of the sword. People cannot be made obedient except 
with the sword! The sword is the key to paradise, which can be opened only for holy 
warriors! Does all that mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? 
I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim (As cited in Rubin & Rubin, p. 
29).   
Following the overthrow of the existing government, Khomeini became the supreme 
leader of Iran in 1979 and remained in that post until his death in 1989. He clearly believed that 
Islam urges all Muslims to seek the illusionary past perfect of Islam, violently if needed. 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 was a call to reinstitute an Islamic state, one that was willingly 
accepted by the masses. Islam does not fully separate politics, government, or the rule of law. 
Religion is politics and politics is religion. To the followers of Islam there is no other way 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2002). 
The Iranian revolution galvanized the radical ideology that other Islamists groups had 
been seeking. The people of Iran embraced a leader of that radical ideology. For most it was a 
return to the purity of Islam and a chance to reclaim Islam’s rightful place in the world (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2002). 
Was Iran influenced by an individual who perverted Islam for his own personal gains and 
agendas, much like the modern terrorists have been accused of? Or did the people of Iran 
willingly follow because they believed in the message as much as the messenger himself? Are 
the modern terrorists simply following a grotesque perversion of Islam, or are they legitimized 
by the cultural influences of Islam and its followers? These questions are central to 
understanding the enemy and shaping anti-terrorism policy. David Zeidan, a religious studies 
expert, defines Islamist (peaceful and violent) goals as:  
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[a] restoration of Islamic glory [that] will be achieved by purifying society from un-
Islamic teachings and practices, by a return to Islam’s original pure sources (the Quran—
God’s written revelation through Muhammad, and Hadith, the divinely inspired traditions 
of the Prophet’s sayings and deeds) as the only authority, and by the establishment of an 
ideal Islamic state modeled on that of the Prophet and his Companions (As cited in Rubin 
& Rubin, pp 11-12). 
Zeidan argues that Islamists are motivated by the teachings of Islam and not on a 
perverted interpretation of those teachings. Furthermore, he believes they “concentrate their 
efforts on capturing the state and its centers of powers—either legally within the democratic 
framework, or violently by revolution or coup d’etat,” and that: 
[even though] fundamentalists are a minority in most Muslim societies and states , their 
insistent and vehement discourse has had much effect on the Muslim world, moving into 
the vacuum left by the failure of secular regimes, redefining orthodoxy, reconstituting the 
boundaries of political power relations, limiting the borders of the permissible, resonating 
in the hearts of the impoverished masses, and appealing to a new strata of literate people 
with modern technical education (As cited in Rubin & Rubin, pp 11-12).  
Zeidan emphasizes that Islamists are not perverting Islam but rather following the teachings of 
Islam. This is in direct contradiction the aforementioned Bush administration’s view of whom 
and what America is fighting in the global war on terror.  
It is clear that Islam as a religion, as a complete and all encompassing way of life, can’t 
be ignored when developing air transportation policy to combat modern Islamist terrorism. A 
nation can kill, capture, or neutralize any number of terrorists, but if the basic value system 
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(Islam) of a people says to continue fighting against a real or perceived enemy, then it may well 
continue without end. 
One should look no further than the ongoing unrest between Palestine and Israel to see 
what fundamentalist Islam has done to undermine peace. History shows Israel has not been the 
primary instigator of violence and has tried on numerous occasions to broker more peaceful 
relations (CNN.com, 2006). Islam, however, and its well documented disdain for the Jewish 
State, has continually frustrated any hopes of peace. The Arab world has been publicly calling 
for the elimination of Israel since its creation in 1947. Indeed, as recently as 2006, Iran officially 
stated Israel should be “wiped off the map” and that the Holocaust was a “myth” (CNN.com). 
Is this hatred a modern day phenomenon? Are the policies of the West to blame for the 
violence as is popularly believed? It is very likely that a great majority of westerners perceive the 
conflict between Jews and Arab Muslims is largely to blame on the so called occupation of holy 
lands by Israelis. This view, however, would be myopic when considering the words of the 
prophet Muhammad himself:  
Abu Huraira reported Allah’s Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: ‘The last 
hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims 
would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone 
or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and 
kill him’ but the tree Gharqad would not say, for it is the tree of the Jews (Bukhari, 
4:52:176, 177 and 4:56:791).  
Again, the recurring themes of violence can be found at the core of Islam and are still used today 
by fundamentalists to justify their violent positions. 
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Any discussion of the modern fundamentalist terrorist would not be complete without 
examining the role of the martyr, or one who is willing to fight and die for Allah (God). 
Martyrdom is part of all the great religions of the world, but the role it plays in Islam is a 
fundamental difference between Islam and all other religions, particularly Christianity and 
Judaism. In Islam, a martyr is defined as “the word for the confession or profession of faith, 
indicating that [the] willingness to sacrifice all, even life itself, is the ultimate profession or 
eternal witness of faith.”, and that this “provides Muslims with a model and ideology for protest, 
resistance and revolutionary change” (Esposito, 2005, p. 14).  
Without the concept of martyrdom Islamist terrorists may have a more difficult time 
recruiting willing volunteers to sacrifice their lives for Allah. Martyrdom is firmly solidified in 
the teachings of Islam, and as such will be very a difficult concept to change or moderate. The 
prophet Muhammad spoke of martyrdom frequently, and his words, narrated by Abu, are telling:  
The Prophet said, ‘The person who participates in (Holy battles) in Allah’s cause and 
nothing compels him to do so except belief in Allah and his Apostles, will be 
recompensed by Allah either with a reward, or booty (if he survives) or will be admitted 
to Paradise (if he is killed in the battle as a martyr). Had I not found it difficult for my 
followers, then I would not remain behind any sariya going for Jihad and I would have 
loved to be martyred in His cause (Bukhari, volume 1, book 2, number 35).  
The problem with martyrdom, filled with promises of abundant pleasures and rewards, is that it 
could supplant the initial rationale for violence, which is the love of Islam and Allah. In other 
words, dying as a martyr could become more important than actually achieving a strategic result 
with that death.  
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On the final evening prior to 9/11 attacks, 19 hijackers were given final instructions in 
preparation for their “mission.” The instructions were believed to be written by Abdul Aziz al-
Omari and stated the following:  
Let your breast be filled with gladness, for there is nothing between you and your 
wedding [with God/paradise] but mere seconds. There will begin a happy and contented 
life and immortal blessings with the prophets, the true ones and the righteous martyrs. 
They are the best of companions. We beseech God for his graces. So seek good omens. 
For the Prophet, May blessings and peace be upon him, used to love divinations about 
every matter…Then recite the words of God, you are wishing for death before 
encountering it, then you saw it, and are looking for it. And you wanted it (As cited in 
McDermott, 2005, Appendix B pxx). 
Violence, hatred, intolerance, and martyrdom, although found in all religions, appear to 
be at the forefront of radical Islam. Furthermore, those teachings could be a prime contributor in 
the recruitment of suicide bombers. Islam looks to be in turmoil, anachronistic, and in desperate 
need of answers. Islamist fundamentalists ostensibly desire the return to past glory when Islam 
ruled the Arab world by whatever means necessary, including destruction of life and property. 
Moreover, it does not matter if potential victims are Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or any other 
faith, as long as objectives are met 
U.S. counterterrorism policy defines the enemy as a small group of disturbed ideologues 
supporting a doctrinaire interpretation of Islam (Bush, 2006). The problem, however, appears to 
be farther reaching and more challenging than finding a group of malcontents and arresting them 
for bad behavior. The problem may be Islam itself, which is intertwined and inseparable from 
any Muslim state or individual.  
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 Defining terrorists in simplistic terms is one characteristic of the global war on terror. 
This is either a capitulation to the forces of political correctness or a grave error on the part of 
current policy makers. The question going forward is what implications do these apparent 
oversimplifications have for current U.S. counter-terrorism and airline security strategy? Are 
these objectives sound, or do they require revision? What are the perceived reactions to these 
policies by the very people who work in the airline transportation environment? 
 As mentioned previously, the President’s National Security Strategy released in March, 
2006, outlines the Untied States’ plan to combat the global war on terror. While written in broad 
strokes, it is clear that the strategy is organized, introspective, and realizes the enemy is more 
than what is being publicly touted. The following is a key excerpt from the National Security 
Strategy that reveals why Islam, as a religio-political entity, was considered during the 
formulation of this strategy:  
Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we 
always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace 
against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building 
good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging 
free and open societies on every continent. In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is 
to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because 
these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these 
aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want 
their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people on 
earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of 
the secret police (Bush, pp. 2-3). 
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 The principles of liberty and justice, as western civilization understands them, don’t 
appear to exist within Islamic countries. In his speeches President Bush is ostensibly attempting 
to find common ground by addressing basic human instincts for self determination and freedom. 
He is not addressing the values of a few, but rather an entire society. Islam would have to be 
reinterpreted in order to incorporate these values. Bush further illustrates:  
America’s constitution has served us well. Many other nations, with different histories 
and cultures, facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these core 
principles into their own systems of governance. History has not been kind to those 
nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people (Bush, 2006, p. 
3).  
Interestingly, President Bush references entire nations and not simply individual groups: “We 
will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by…supporting moderate and modern 
governments, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that 
promote terrorism, do not find fertile ground in any nation” (Bush, p. 5). 
The aforementioned quote is a strong reference to the ideologies of Islam that promote 
terrorism and anarchy. It is these ideologies that must be addressed in order to help secure the 
U.S. air transportation system. The National Security Strategy examines many other factors that 
need attention in order to protect the United States from terrorism. It is a blueprint used in 
determining a problem and outlining a solution. Of course, like all policy, it is only as good as 
the agencies empowered to carry out its mandates. The Director of National Intelligence, whose 
“job is to effectively integrate foreign, military and domestic intelligence in defense of the 
homeland and of United States interests abroad” (Negroponte, 2006, p. 1), must also have a 
broad understanding of the threat in order to counter it with effective policy.  
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 A component of the Director’s responsibility is to devise and implement a National 
Intelligence Strategy to complement the President’s National Security Strategy. The strategy’s 
main priority is: 
to inform and warn the President, the Cabinet, the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
commanders in the field, domestic law enforcement and homeland security authorities in 
the homeland, and our international allies. In this sense, as President Bush has stated, 
intelligence is America’s first line of defense... (Negroponte, 2006, p. 1). 
An objective of the Intelligence Strategy is to “Anticipate developments of strategic concern and 
identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision makers.” It seeks to accomplish this 
by promoting “deeper cultural understanding,” and “better language proficiency…among 
personnel at all levels” (Negroponte, 2006, p. 1). These passages indicate the U.S. is not merely 
looking for a few common criminals. After all, law enforcement authorities didn’t need cultural 
understanding when catching the bombers of the World Trade Center in 1993.  
Examples from the 2006 National Security Strategy and National Intelligence Strategy 
reveal an administration which understands Islam is a contributing factor and must be addressed 
when formulating effective counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy framers are using language 
of diplomacy to outline a plan for victory. This language should not be confused with a lack of 
direction or understanding. It should be viewed as a tool for keeping different nations, religions 
and cultures on the same “politically correct” page when attempting to define and implement 
strategy and policy. Without factoring the religion of Islam as a contributor to the cycle of 
violent ideologues that continue to emerge from Middle Eastern Islamic nations, the United 
States would severely disadvantage herself from finding effective and lasting solutions to the 
dangers of Islamist Terrorism. 
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Historical Perspective 
Terrorism is feared and loathed in every nation of the world. It is understandable given 
the exposure terrorist attacks have been given in the media since 9/11. The seeming randomness 
of violence and innocent lives targeted, however, lend a great deal to the fear and 
misunderstanding of terrorism as a political weapon. The fact is, terrorism is a relatively rare 
event that kills very few people—far fewer than civil wars, traffic accidents, or homicide 
(Englhart & Kurzman, 2006, p.1958). The social disruptions generated by terrorist attacks and 
the attention paid to them is responsible for the disproportionate level of concern given to these 
attacks (Englhart & Kurzman, 2006).  This is especially true with the perceptions of passengers 
and employees of the nation’s airlines. Every day millions of passenger’s board thousands of 
flights to hundreds of destinations without any disruption or delay attributed to terrorist activity, 
yet terrorism remains among the greatest concern of a post 9/11 nation. To place it in proper 
context, over 1.6 billion passengers boarded the world’s airlines in 2002, and 1.7 billion in 2003. 
In the United States alone, there were over 675 million passengers in 2002 and over 682 million 
in 2003 (Bricker, 2005, p. 615). A greater understanding of terrorism is necessary in order to 
determine how certain groups, particularly airline pilots, perceive the threat of terrorism and their 
ideas to secure against it. 
The word “terrorism” finds its genesis in the Latin terrere, which literally means to 
frighten. The first recorded use of the word is associated with the French Revolution’s “Reign of 
Terror” during the 18th Century. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as 
the “calculated use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear, intended to coerce or try to 
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, 
or ideological.” Historically, terrorism has been designed to instill fear in whole populations by 
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targeting a small, representative group. However, as the attacks by radical Islamist terrorists on 
September 11, 2001, have shown, this historical perspective on terrorism may be changing. 
Instead of waging proportionate attacks designed for maximum effectiveness, modern terrorists 
now seek to inflict maximum damage and destruction as an end in itself, thus turning terrorism 
into a war of annihilation (Miller, 2006, p. 127). 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States was suddenly plunged 
into a new era of warfare. Although terrorism attacks were not a new concept, it was the first 
sizable assault by Islamist terrorists to be executed on U.S. soil. Not since the 1941 Japanese 
attacks on Pearl Harbor have the U.S. had to react to such a threat (Ranstorp, 1996 p. 43).  The 
question continues to be why such behavior and actions exist at all, and which policies can be 
implemented to counteract that behavior.  
Islamist terrorists have almost universally experienced a sense of crisis in their 
environment, which has led to an increase in disaffected groups formed in response to this 
problem. The crisis contains failings of social, political and economic dimensions of their 
environment, which have resulted in a spiritual fragmentation and a radicalization of their society 
(Ranstorp, 1996).  Gaining an understanding of the motivations, issues and concerns of Islamist 
terrorists may prove to be the most effective tool in countering the effects of such lethal 
behavior.  
The Media and Perceptions 
Since the events of 9/11, the word and concept of terrorism have seeped into every facet 
of America’s conscience. The economy, government, media, and, of course, transportation have 
all been profoundly affected. Consumers in general have all been impacted by terrorist events in 
the U.S. and other countries of the world. Despite ongoing efforts of the global war on terror, the 
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number of terror incidents around the world continues to grow in frequency. Given the spread of 
terrorist organizations, the phenomenon of terrorism has become a social structural condition. 
Despite the continued permeation of terrorism, our knowledge of it and its implications for 
policy remain poorly understood (Shrivastava, 2005, p. 63). It is important to understand the 
perceptions of those who are most at risk in the airline environment, and what are the 
contributing factors to those perceptions. 
The issues going forward include how to integrate the theoretical and practical, which 
requires insight into the perceptions of those who are affected most from the emerging threat of 
terrorism. As our society undergoes a radical change in airline security, so too will the 
perceptions of the threat facing our public transportation system. In the U.S., new levels of social 
anxiety over terrorism have surfaced since September 11, 2001, most specifically worries over 
airline security in general (Welch, 2006, p. 94). These anxieties undoubtedly play a large role in 
shaping existing perceptions of threat by airline pilots. 
A day does not pass where the Global War on Terror is not highlighted in some manner, 
specifically in the media. Understanding how the media chooses to report on terrorist incidents 
has significant consequences for how the public perceives terrorism. Furthermore, policy makers 
respond to terrorism and terrorists’ attempts to use media to accomplish their objectives 
(Chemrak & Gruenewald, 2006, p. 431). The public relies heavily on news sources for 
information about terrorism and its related impacts. The accessibility and frequency of the media 
have altered how most Americans feel and perceive the threat of terrorism in the post 9/11 world 
(Chemrak & Gruenewald, 2006). 
Terrorism acts such as bombings and hijackings can satisfy multiple objectives for 
terrorists including the realization of their cause, funding, strengthening resolve, and spreading 
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fear and revenge. For groups or individuals who believe their concerns are being ignored, 
terrorism becomes a powerful vehicle of communication to gain access to the world’s media 
(Chemrak & Gruenewald, 2006). “There is no doubt that their [terrorists] deeds are planned and 
executed with the mass media and their effects on the masses and governmental decision makers 
in mind” (Chemrak & Gruenewald, p. 433). The American public has been bombarded with 
highly mediated images of terrorists and terrorism events since September 11, 2001. Perceived 
threats and heightened security alerts abound in daily media coverage, and political speeches, 
leading to what may be termed a moral panic (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004, p. 327). 
The concept of moral panic has been used to define social issues for over 30 years. Cohen 
(1973) was the first to present an inclusive definition of a moral panic. According to Cohen, a 
moral panic occurs when: 
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat 
to societal values or interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians or other right-thinking people…Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite 
novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough but 
suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten…at 
other times it has more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce such 
changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself 
(Cohen, 1973, p. 9). 
It is clear that exposure to the 9/11 attacks was largely felt through the media including 
both media coverage of the actual attacks and the subsequent weeks of coverage, reviewed in 
ever widening detail, of the horrific consequences. Additionally, the media repeatedly raised the 
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prospect of future attacks against the U.S. air transportation system (Marshall et al, p. 305). 
Unlike most disasters, the specific aspects of 9/11—its scale, unpredictability, novelty as a 
threat, and implications for future safety, together with media saturation of graphic images and 
frequent government warnings of future attacks—signaled the potential that there was a 
significant ongoing threat, with greatly elevated risk for being harmed in additional attacks 
(Marshall et al., 2001).  It is this ongoing media assault that has undoubtedly helped shape the 
perceptions of risk factors among active airline pilots in the United States. 
The media coverage of terrorist attacks, training camps, interviews, or photo shoots 
became part of the planning and strategy of terrorist groups. It is this exposure that unwittingly 
makes the media accomplices in the success or failure of a terrorist’s goals (Vaisman-Tzachor, 
2007, p. 55). Media reporting, in essence, becomes a recruiting partner and instrument in the 
terrorist act. In essence, the media have become a primary vehicle used in advancing the terrorist 
message, as well as a primary vehicle for recruiting new terrorists. Ironically, the Unites States 
investment in the democratic principles of freedom of speech is the vehicle used to advance the 
cause of many terrorist organizations around the globe (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007). 
Conversely, however, media reporters have been able to gain access to terrorist leader 
and foot soldiers, their families, training facilities, etc., and provide insights into the minds of the 
terrorists that few other organizations, if any, can provide. Despite this access, media information 
about terrorists has been largely excluded from any serious consideration by the intelligence and 
academic community’s thus far (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2007). Clearly, the media have a massive 
influence, both positive and negative, in advancing or curtailing terrorist activities. This 
influence is bound to shape and influence the perceptions of security matters among pilots of the 
nation’s air carriers.  
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The media play an enormous role in determining air transportation risk factors. The 
problem is whether or not the media contribute to the threat of terrorism in a negative way. 
Suicide missions are viewed as irrational or misguided acts of uninformed people driven by 
despair or fanaticism. Even when the media report the possibility that a suicide bomber acts from 
a real injustice, they still tend to accentuate the theme that grievances never justify violence. The 
message is that violence expresses hate, which leads to reciprocal violence in destructive 
escalations of hostilities. Who is actually blamed depends on which news outlet is reporting the 
violence. Western (especially American) media generally blame the Palestinians and their 
supporters for the ongoing violence between Arabs and Israelis, whereas non-Western media 
such as al Jazeera tend to blame Israel and supporters, especially the United States (Turk, 2004, 
p. 275). 
The media employing sympathetic descriptions of terrorists and terrorism is a major issue 
for counterterrorism policy. Governmental authorities and agencies are predisposed to 
minimizing the risks of either sympathy for terrorists or public fear of terrorism. As such, the 
implication for counterterrorism policy is to deny legitimacy to terrorist acts and to discourage 
the media from granting too public a voice for terrorists and terrorist groups. As such, arguments 
for and against censoring media coverage of terrorist events, including statements issued by 
terrorists, are summarized below (Schmid & de Graaf 1982, p. 172). The dilemma for 
government authorities however, is how to minimize publicity for terrorists without pushing 
them into increasingly destructive acts (Turk, 2004). 
Arguments for censorship: 
Terrorists use the media for propaganda, which helps recruit new supporters. 
Publicity is a major goal of terrorism. 
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Detailed reporting of incidents gives potential terrorists suggestions and models for 
action.  
Information broadcasts during an incident can be useful to the terrorists involved. 
Media presence can endanger hostages. 
Reporting terrorist acts can lead to imitation. 
Media reports may panic kidnappers into killing their victims. 
People without respect for others’ lives should not be enabled to command public 
attention by using violence. 
Describing terrorist’s acts might promote sadism in some members of the public. 
Reporting terrorist outrages might provoke vigilantism and revenge attacks on the group 
for whom the terrorists claim to be acting. 
Negative news is demoralizing. (Turk, 2004, p. 276). 
 
Arguments against censorship: 
Not reporting terrorist atrocities might lead people to less negative judgments of 
terrorists. 
Publicity can be a substitute for violence. 
Censorship might force terrorists to raise the level of violence. 
Not reporting terrorist events would encourage rumors, which might be worse. 
Media presence can help prevent police actions that cause unnecessary casualties among 
both terrorists and victims. 
Censorship enables officials to label any dissidents as terrorists, thus undermining legal 
safeguards. 
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Media credibility would decline. 
Lack of news might result in a false sense of security, leaving the public unprepared to 
deal with terrorist attacks. 
Lack of awareness would keep the public from understanding the political situation. 
Feeling deprived of information might increase public distrust of the authorities. 
Terrorists’ claims that democracies are not really free would gain credibility. (Turk, 
2004, p. 277). 
Reaction to 9/11 
 It appears the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent media coverage of the event have had a 
dramatic influence on U.S. society. The creation of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), 
Department of Homeland Security, and FBI reforms are all examples of 9/11’s impact on 
security policy. There has also been increased emphasis on the building of global partnerships 
for sharing intelligence and data concerning terrorism. Furthermore, many states have developed, 
or are developing, fusion centers to increase the exchange of information across government 
sectors to improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 
2007, p. 143). 
The blueprint for this new federal security system was the Homeland Security Bill, which 
was signed into law by President Bush on November 26, 2002. The bill established the 
Department of Homeland Security, resulting in the largest federal government reorganization in 
the U.S. since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. Among its goals were to 
reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and prevention of further terrorist attacks (Fraher, 
2004, p. 584). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created to protect the 
nation’s transportation system and to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. 
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The TSA promptly hired and trained 45,000 federal screeners to fill positions at all 429 of 
America’s commercial airports (Fraher, 2004). 
These agencies are supporting the global war on terror and, as such, tend to be front and 
center in media reports. This is especially true of the TSA, whose duties now include all 
screening of passengers and baggage at our nation’s airports. Since 9/11, hundreds of media 
reports have described the new stresses and hassles of air travel including long airport security 
lines and threats of airline hijackings and bombings. Furthermore, media reports have suggested 
that air travel stresses may lead to overwhelming levels of stress for those who work in the travel 
industry (Bricker, 2005). 
The mystery facing those charged with keeping airports safe in a global era is that of 
keeping airports as accessible as possible to legitimate travelers and as inaccessible as possible to 
illegitimate ones. Economic globalization depends on the liberalization of trade and reduction of 
barriers to the flow of goods and persons (Lyon, 2006, p. 401). The only way to accomplish this 
is by keeping airports as open and stress free to the traveler as possible.  
The balance between civil liberty and national security has always been of paramount 
importance to Americans. The tautological argument of how liberty can be secured without 
losing that liberty is a central issue in a post-9/11 world. Unfortunately, the very freedoms and 
liberties Americans value are often exploited by terrorists. The attacks of 9/11 ushered in a new 
era of warfare in the form of Islamist terrorism. Unlike historically traditional wars, terrorism 
presents an array of problematic security issues that previous generations simply did not have to 
face. Generally speaking, past wars have been fought on foreign soil against well-defined 
combatants. It was clear who the enemy was and what their objectives were. Present day 
terrorism, however, uses very different tactics from those of the past. 
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Screening and Policy 
The majority of security measures have been designed to counteract the threat of 
terrorism domestically as well as internationally. How effective those polices are is debatable on 
many levels. Policy makers often fail to use the local knowledge of those who possess the most 
intimate understanding of a given situation. Any large social process will inevitably be far more 
complex than the structural framework we can devise to understand it (James, 1998, p. 309). 
Because of these complexities it is vital that local knowledge, and not just that of chosen policy 
makers, be used when formulating effective strategy and policy. This notion of local familiarity, 
or mētis, is a Greek concept for comparing the forms of knowledge embedded within local 
experience with the more general or abstract knowledge deployed by the government and its 
technical agencies (Scott, 1998, p. 311). 
Public policy should be informed by local knowledge combined with those of so called 
“experts.” Rank and file employees of the air transportation system could be a helpful source of 
knowledge and expertise when formulating security policy. Commercial transportation security 
policy has clearly focused on passenger screening as the primary source of security.  A 2003 
Government Accounting Office report stated: “Passenger screening is critical to the security of 
our nation’s aviation system, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is tasked with securing all modes of 
transportation, including the screening of airline passengers. TSA has met numerous 
requirements in this regard, such as deploying 50,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial 
airports nationwide” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2).  
Additionally, a 2007 GAO report observed: “The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) 
has identified the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce as its most important asset in 
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securing commercial aviation” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, p. 1). TSOs are 
responsible for screening passengers and luggage to prevent dangerous items from coming 
onboard commercial aircraft. As such, they are easily the most visible part of commercial 
aviation security. The TSA deploys TSOs to the more than 400 commercial airports to monitor 
passengers as they walk through metal detectors, examine carry on items on X-Ray machines, 
and conduct more thorough inspections of passengers selected for additional screening (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, p. 2). 
The impetus for this focus on screening probably had to do with the fact that 19 terrorists 
made it through screening checkpoints on 9/11 with virtually no effort. Two weeks later, in a 
joint hearing before congress, representatives of the Committee on Governmental affairs stated 
that “this congress and this administration has to expeditiously develop a comprehensive plan to 
ensure the safety of the traveling public, the security of our airports, and the continued viability 
of the aviation industry. First and foremost I believe the federal government should immediately 
take responsibility for the screening of passengers and carry on luggage and the control of 
security checkpoints at our Nation’s airports” (Joint Hearing before the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 2001, p. 1). In the same hearing, Senator Joe Lieberman added: “In light 
of the tragic events of September 11, the adequacy of airport screening procedures if of 
immediate, paramount, and of very wide concern to the American people and to members of 
congress” (Joint Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2001, p. 2).  The focus 
on screening continued: “As again has been over and over said in the last two weeks and before 
by the gentleman sitting before us and others, this screening workforce has been characterized as 
underpaid, under trained, and under experienced, with turnover rates that sometime exceed 400 
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percent…training and background checks for these employees is minimal” (Joint Hearing before 
the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 2001, p. 6). 
The focus on screening clearly dominated this hearing: “Last June, GAO reported that 
screeners missed as many as 20 percent of dangerous objects at screening checkpoint”, “what 
new procedures and technologies can be employed to improve screening,” “We do know that as 
far back as the late 1970’s, both the FAA and the airlines characterized the performance or lack 
of performance of screening personnel as significant and alarming,” “The first alternative is one 
in which the air carrier would continue to be responsible for conducting screening…The second 
alternative is one in which each airport authority would be responsible for screening…The third 
alternative is based on a new DOT agency…created to conduct a national screening 
program….And the fourth alternative is a new quasi-government corporation…created to 
conduct a national screening program” (Joint Hearing before the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, 2001, p. 14). 
The Greek concept of mētis, which is broadly understood to represent a wide variety of 
practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing human 
environment, appears to be lacking in the formulation of post 9/11 aviation policy. The 
aforementioned hearings on security were attended by Senators, Congressmen and 
Congresswoman, committee members, and various other heads of fields relevant to the matters at 
hand. Absent was the local knowledge of pilots, flight attendants, and other employee groups of 
the nation’s airlines. Certainly union leadership was consulted later on in the process; however, 
at American Airlines, no rank and file member has ever been asked for input regarding security 
policy.  
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Mētis is a valuable contributor to policy making because the skills required to operate in 
a commercial aviation environment cannot be taught apart from engaging in the activity itself. 
The observations and experiences of regular exposure to a particular environment simply cannot 
be transferred to someone who does not have the same local knowledge (Scott, 1998). 
Furthermore knowing how and when to apply the local knowledge in a concrete situation is the 
essence of mētis. The subtleties of application are important precisely because mētis is most 
valuable in settings that are fluctuating and indeterminate. Such local knowledge is particular and 
can only be acquired by local practice and experience (Scott, 1998).  
Post 9/11 aviation security policy has focused on screening to a large extent. However, 
even prior to 9/11, the focus was on airport screeners. In an April 2000, Subcommittee on 
Aviation Hearing, Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison planned to “introduce legislation that would direct 
the FAA to improve training requirements for security screeners by September 30th of this year. 
The FAA should require a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 40 hours of 
practical, on the job training before an individual is deemed qualified to provide screening 
services” (Hutchison, 2000, p 2).  
Despite these “improvements” by policy makers to screener qualifications, 
ineffectiveness continued to plague the system. Congresswoman Barbara Boxer addressed the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on August 8, 2002: “At the beginning of 
July, just a month ago, I was shocked to read that checkpoint screeners at airports in Los Angeles 
and Sacramento were ranked in the bottom 5 airports for high failure rates. The examiners who 
were doing these tests did not even attempt to hide weapons and the screeners still did not find 
them” (Boxer, 2002, p. 2).  Despite the continuing emphasis on screening within aviation policy, 
it seems to be marginally better than it was prior to 9/11. According to the International Security 
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Group, a security consulting company, “significant resources have been allocated since 9/11 to 
improve aviation security in the United States. The area that has received perhaps the most 
attention is the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) pre-departure screening for 
commercial flights. Yet despite the infusion of resources for this activity, as well as for other on-
board and on-site initiatives, progress appears uneven and a number of important security gaps 
remain” (Wienek, 2005, p. 1).  
The focus on screening has become the face of airline security policy.  No other post 9/11 
change is more visible than that of the screening line.  Everything from aftershave lotion to nail 
clippers is examined when a passenger passes through these checkpoints.  The impossible task of 
screening hundreds of millions of passengers per year continues to be a main focus of policy 
makers.  The debate continues over the effectiveness of screening, and how to make it more 
effective.  
Policy formulation generally occurs in stages starting with identification of a problem 
(such as the 9/11 screening failures). Next comes agenda setting or focusing the attention of mass 
media and public officials on specific problems. Policies are then formulated through initiation 
and development by policy-planning organizations, interest groups, government bureaucracies, 
the President, and Congress. Then next phase is legitimating of policies by interest groups, the 
President, and Congress. Implementation of policies is carried out largely by executive 
government agencies. Finally, the policies are evaluated by government agencies, outside 
consultants, the media, and the public (Dye, 1998, p. 317). 
The aforementioned overview is an obvious oversimplification of the complexities of 
governmental policy-making; however, it does illustrate how local knowledge, or mētis, is often 
not considered when formulating policy.  The formulation phase of policy making is supposed to 
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consider the inputs of various organizations and interest groups but often times fail in that 
endeavor.  The result is a failure to consider the local knowledge and inputs from the very 
individuals policymakers are purported to protect.  Consider that current aviation security policy 
completely failed to consult the rank and file pilots of the world’s largest airline, even though 
they are the most affected and suffer the consequences of any breach of security. The bias is 
unfortunate, however, because the individual does offer a unique viewpoint and substantial local 
knowledge of a given situation. This apathy leads to the observation that individual participation 
in policymaking is often simply overlooked (Anderson, 1994, p. 70). 
Numerous factors clearly contribute to policymaking, which in turn affects perceptions of 
employees, passengers and mangers of the nation’s airlines. A greater understanding of terrorism 
and its causes, goals, and impact will further influence and shape attitudes and policies on how 
best to combat this continuing threat. Anxiety over the attacks of 9/11 clearly remains high. How 
do the nation’s pilots perceive the threat of terrorism? Should they be consulted on their opinions 
about security related matters? If they are responsible for the safety of the aircraft then they 
should observe a great deal of security issues. Where are the weak points?  How have the media, 
government policy, and airline policy affected perceptions? Moreover, do the pilots feel safe? 
Are there significant, measurable differences among pilots as it pertains to age, sex, crew base, 
political affiliation, or assigned type of aircraft? These and other questions are what this 
researcher attempted to discover.  In such findings may be useful in the formulation of future 
policies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY  
The purpose of this study was to explore the potential various dimensions of airline 
security after 9/11 as perceived by pilots employed by American Airlines. These dimensions 
were measured by distributing a 50-question survey that was statistically analyzed using factor 
analysis and correlation. The data were used to reveal perceptions and observations of security-
related matters from current American Airline pilots. It was hypothesized that American Airline 
pilots would have a different perception of threats to air security from what is more commonly 
propagated by current U.S. policy.  
Participants 
 The population used for the study was all currently employed pilots of American 
Airlines, as obtained via the Allied Pilots Association (APA) seniority list. The APA is the 
collective bargaining union that represents all pilots who are employed by American Airlines. 
The seniority list is rank ordered from the most senior pilot (employed with the company for the 
longest period of time), to most junior (employed for the shortest period of time). The seniority 
list only changes in the event of retirement, death, resignation or hiring of an existing or future 
pilot. At the time of survey dissemination, there were 8,137 pilots on the seniority list.  
The survey was designed to be taken by pilots who were currently employed by 
American Airlines. The decision was made to make the survey available online via the Allied 
Pilots Association website (www.alliedpilots.org). The union has a variety of functions and 
committees that respond to the various needs of the membership. One of those is the safety and 
security committee, which was contacted via telephone to arrange permission for the survey to 
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be placed on the union website. The union frequently conducts and distributes various surveys to 
its members using internal software and personnel.  
 Permission was granted after the union president and board of directors were made aware 
of the reasons and content of the survey. The safety and security committee then placed a hard 
copy of the survey into electronic format and placed it onto the APA website. An e-mail “blast” 
was then sent out to all currently employed pilots informing them of the survey and its location 
on the website. The survey remained on the website for 10 days in which 658 responses were 
registered for a response rate of 8.08%.  
Data Collection Instrument 
 The data collection instrument in this study was an on-line questionnaire 
consisting of 50 questions divided into three parts: a demographics section that included 
questions on age, experience, and education; a section concerning airline security including 
questions on airport perimeter security, ramp security, and flight-deck security. The final section 
consisted of questions designed to measure actual threat perceptions such as likelihoods of 
various breaches of air security. 
Data Analysis 
Sample Characteristics 
Univariate descriptives of the sample characteristics were analyzed for the following 
variables: gender, crew base assigned, type of aircraft flown, international or domestic routes 
flown, position assigned in the flight deck, years at American Airlines, previous military 
experience, and political ideology. Gender was coded such that male = 1 and female 0. Crew 
base describes the originating location of the crew member that is largely determined by 
individual preference and organizational need. The following values were used to denote the 9 
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crew bases located around the nation: Boston = 1, Washington DC = 2, Dallas = 3, Los Angeles 
= 4, Miami, New York = 5, Miami = 6, Chicago = 7, San Francisco = 8, and Saint Louis = 9.  
Aircraft category was also considered to be an important variable for consideration and 
was coded as such: widebody = 1 (more than one aisle and the 757) or a narrowbody = 0, which 
as only one aisle. Whether the pilots flew domestic or international routes was coded as such 
international = 1 or domestic routing = 0, again based on needs of the company and seniority 
preferences. Seniority and personal preference also determine whether a pilot is assigned as the 
captain = 1 or first officer = 2. The distinction between captain and first officer is important 
because the captain is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft from the 
moment the aircraft departs until it arrives at its destination. The first officer does not experience 
the same level of responsibility as is imposed on the captain. The length of service for pilots at 
American Airlines was measured in years. Finally, political ideology was included with the 
following categories: very conservative = 1, conservative = 2, moderate = 3, liberal = 4 very 
liberal = 5, and other = 6. 
The results of univariate analyses indicate that the sample was predominately male 
(96.6%) and occupied the rank of first officer (53.3%). Respondents ranged in age from 33 years 
old to 62 years, with a mean of 48.8.  The percentage of pilots who flew domestic routes was 
54.8%, while 68.0% reported previous military experience. Additionally, the mean length of 
service at American Airlines was 16.79 years, and 93.4% of respondents reported completing at 
least a 4-year college degree. Finally, 62.3% of respondents listed their political ideology as 
“conservative” to “very conservative.”  
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The majority of respondents reported Dallas Fort Worth (26.8%) as their home base and 
reported an aircraft type of wide body (50.9%) (See Table 1).  Of the type of routes flown, 
international or domestic, 55.3% reported flying domestic routes only.   
Table 1 
Univariate Sample Descriptives – Part A 
 
Age Gender Crew Base Aircraft Type Route Type 
Valid 638 638 639 633 635 
Missing 2 2 1 7 5 
Mean 48.816 .97 4.98 .51 .45 
Median 49.000 1.00 5.00 1.00 .00 
Mode 48.00 1 3 1 0 
Std. Deviation 5.9390 .183 2.233 .500 .498 
Skewness -.215 -5.115 .341 -.035 .213 
Std. Error of Skewness .097 .097 .097 .097 .097 
Range 29.00 1 9 1 1 
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Table 2 
Univariate Sample Descriptives – Part B 
 
Military 
Experience 
Years at 
American 
Airlines 
Highest Level of 
Education 
Completed Political Ideology
Valid 635 628 639 634 
Missing 5 12 4 6 
Mean .68 16.790 3.18 2.38 
Median 1.00 17.00 3.00 2.00 
Mode 1 17.00 3 2 
Std. Deviation .467 6.71446 .601 .965 
Skewness -.775 -.187 -.653 1.200 
Std. Error of Skewness .097 .098 .109 .097 
Range 1 33.25 3 5 
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Scale Development Perceived Risk 
Using SPSS 15.0, responses to the 27 questions were subjected to a Principal Axis factor 
analysis with an oblique rotation. Principal axis extraction was selected to reduce the probability 
of capitalizing on errors in measurement typically enjoyed by the alternative method—Principal 
Components analysis. To determine the appropriate number of factors the eigenvalues, scree 
plot, and factor loadings were all analyzed.  
The results of the Principal Axis factor analysis suggested the existence of seven unique 
factors (using the eignvalues greater than 1 rule) (Gutman, 1954) that explained 67.02% of the 
variance in the unrotated solution. Finally, to determine if seven factors was the most appropriate 
factor solution, the salient variable rule was used. Here the threshold of practical significance 
was > .30. That is, in order for a factor to be considered valid for extraction it must possess at 
least three items with factor loadings > .30 (unless there are two items with factor loadings > .70) 
and are capable of being named. (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) (See Appendix A). 
 Factor 1 had 6 items with loadings > .30. Items 35 (Unattended aircraft are secured 
sufficiently to prevent unauthorized entry), 32 (Aircraft cargo doors are secure when the aircraft 
is left unattended), 18 (Unattended aircraft are adequately secured), 26 (Ramp worker entry 
points employ adequate screening procedures), 22 (Ramp workers are effectively screened prior 
to entering the ramp), and 29 (Ramp personnel follow security challenge procedures when 
credentials aren’t displayed). As a result, Factor 1 was subsequently labeled “ramp security.”   
Factor 2 had 5 items considered to be practically significant. Items 20 (The flight deck is 
adequately secured from unauthorized access), 24 (Current policies regarding aircrew flight deck 
entry and exit are sufficient to prevent unauthorized access), 16 (I am confident that no 
unauthorized individuals can enter the flight deck), 12 (Flight deck doors are adequately 
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reinforced to prevent unauthorized entry), and 21 (There are a sufficient number of Air 
Marshal’s to deter in-flight terrorist attacks). Factor two was subsequently labeled as “Flight 
deck security.”  
 Six items had factor loading > .30 on Factor 3. Items 15 (TSA screeners are adequately 
trained to identify individuals who pose a threat to aircraft security), 11 (TSA screeners who do 
not perform adequately will be disciplined), 14 (deleted due to cross loading with factor 1), 19 
(TSA screening checkpoints are effective in identifying items that my be used to compromise 
aircraft security), 27 (The TSA adequately screens all baggage), and question 13 (deleted due to 
cross loading with Factor 2). Factor 3 was subsequently labeled as “passenger and luggage 
screening.”  
 Factor 4 had four items considered to be practically significant. Item 34 (Flight 
Attendants actively look for suspicious behavior), 31 (Passengers are likely to intervene in 
threats to aircraft security), 28 (Passengers actively look for suspicious behavior), and item 37 
(Flight Attendants actively look for contraband that may be used to compromise in-flight 
security). Factor 4 was subsequently identified as “coproduction of in-flight safety.”  
 Factor 5 had 2 questions with correlation values of .30 or higher. Normally, three or more 
indicators should be used for legitimacy. In the case of factor 5, two were used because the 
values were greater than .70 (.864 and .760). The indicators are: question 17 (Air Marshals are 
adequately trained to deal with threats to aircraft security), and question 25 (I feel confident of an 
Air Marshal’s ability to handle a terrorist event in flight). Factor 5 was subsequently identified as 
“air marshal protection.”  
 Factor 6 (4.292 total variance explained) had two questions with loadings > .70. Given 
the magnitude of these loadings, 2 items are considered to sufficient to constitute a legitimate 
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factor (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).  Items 36 (Individuals acting nervous are more carefully 
screened than those who appear calm) and 33 (Individuals displaying suspicious behavior receive 
increased screening). Factor 6 was subsequently identified as “passenger profiling” (See 
Appendix A—Item by Factor Loadings)  
Scale Development of Perceived Threat 
Using the data analytic techniques described above, the 13 potential questions measuring 
pilots’ perceived risk were subjected to factor analysis. The results suggested that three factors 
appropriately represented the factor solution and explained 61.86% of the variance in the 
unrotated factor solution. Factor 1 possessed 7 salient variables. Items 50 (Terrorists will attempt 
to compromise aircraft security by securing positions as legitimate airline employees), 48 
(Terrorists will target airport perimeters to compromise aircraft security), 49 (Terrorists will 
likely corrupt airline ground personnel into carrying out their directives), 40 (Terrorists will 
likely penetrate an airport perimeter in order to carry out a terror event sometime in the near 
future), 41 (I believe a missile attack against a U.S. commercial aircraft will happen sometime in 
the near future), 47 (Terrorists will pose as flight personnel to gain access to aircraft in the near 
future), and 42 (I believe there will be another terrorist attack onboard a U.S. commercial aircraft 
sometime in the next five years. Although salient, item 44 was eliminated due to its cross-
loading with factor 2. Factor 1 was subsequently identified as “ground security breach.”  
 Factor 2 had two variables possessing practical significance. Items 38 (Weapons will 
likely be brought through security checkpoints in the future) and 39 (Contraband that could be 
used to compromise aircraft security passes through screening checkpoints). Question 44 was 
eliminated due to cross-loading with factor 1. Factor 2 was subsequently identified as “screening 
breach.”  Similarly, Factor 3 (8.617 total variance explained) had only two items possessing 
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practical significance. Items 45 (Terrorists will gain control over an in-flight aircraft in the near 
future) and 46 (Terrorists will find a way to gain access to the flight-deck, while in-flight, 
sometime in the near future). Factor 3 was subsequently identified as “in-flight takeover” (See 
Appendix B—Item by Factor Loadings). 
Reliability Analysis of Threat and Risk Perceptions 
Cronbach’s alpha is an index of reliability associated with the variation accounted for by 
the true score of an underlying construct. A construct is the hypothetical variable that is being 
measured (Hatcher, 1994). Coefficient Alpha ranges in value from 0 to 1—where a high value 
represents a reliable scale—and may be used to describe the reliability of factors extracted from 
multipoint formatted questionnaires or scales (i.e., rating scale: 1 = disagree, 10 = agree. 
Nunnally (1978) has indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient in the early stages of 
prediction or construct validation.                                            
A reliability analysis of each of the factors suggests that the reliability for each of the 
scales is sufficient for prediction purposes and fairly consistent with the solutions derived from 
the factor analyses. To be sure, initial reliability analysis of Factor 1 (Ramp Security) with the 6 
items suggested by the factor analysis yielded a coefficient α = .886. The results suggested 
removing item 29. The subsequent coefficient α = .897 for the scale consisting of the remaining 
five items. Similarly, the initial coefficient α reported for the proposed 5 items constituting factor 
Flight Deck Security was .865. The analysis suggested removing item 21 (There are a sufficient 
number of Air Marshals to deter in-flight terrorist attacks). The final scale consisting of four 
items achieved α = .897. The reliability analysis for the remaining four factors—Passenger and 
Luggage Screening, Coproduction of In-Flight Safety, Air Marshal Protection, Passenger 
Profiling—all achieved acceptable α coefficients of .751, .756, .810, and .819, respectively, 
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using the results suggested by the factor analysis. Finally, reliability analysis for the Perceived 
Threat scales—Ground Breach, Screening Breach, and In-Flight Attack—all reported acceptable 
levels of α (i.e., .853, .831, .926, respectively)  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 The primary purpose of this exploratory study was to understand the perceptions of 
threats and risks to aviation as observed by American Airlines pilots. Following the events of 
9/11, the United States dramatically transformed security policy to combat future terror events. 
This researcher sought to document the perceived risk and potential threats facing airline security 
among those possessing intimate and local knowledge of existing practices and conditions. More 
specifically, this study tapped the perceptions of pilots not only to better understand the 
potentially complex dimensions constituting airline security but to examine the extent to which 
current practices and policies square with the risk and threat perceptions of those possessing 
unique local knowledge.  
To this end, a tripartite analytic approach was used. First, univariate descriptives were 
used to examine the extent to which the sample data approximate the population of interest. 
Factor and reliability analysis was then used to document the multidimensionality of the 
constructs and assess the appropriateness of the linear combination of variables used to construct 
the scales. Finally, correlation analysis was used to better understand which areas of airline 
security might be targeted by policymakers to enhance existing structures and practices.  
Interpretation of Pilot’s Perceived Risk 
The results of the factor analysis indicate that perceived airline security risk consists of 
several factors. Using the eigenvalues, scree plot, and salient variable rules, the solution deemed 
most appropriate consists of 6 factors that explained 67.02% of the variance in the unrotated 
solution. The eigenvalues for the six factors ranged from 8.650 to 1.159. Factor 1, which was 
subsequently identified as “ramp security,” had the greatest eigenvalue (8.650). This suggests 
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that ramp security is the most salient dimension constituting airline security among pilots at 
American Airlines. In fact, the total variance explained by this single factor was 32.039% (See 
Appendix A—Perceived Risk Factor Analysis) 
The eigenvalue, which represents the variance explained of each of the factors, is only 
one way by which pilot perceptions regarding ramp security can be interpreted. The eigenvalues 
and variance explained only reflect the salience of the perceived factor relative to others. 
Another method of understanding this and other dimensions is to assess the grand mean of the 
scale by comparing it to the anchors employed within the scale and by comparing it to the grand 
mean(s) for the other dimensions. Computation of the means for each of the items constituting 
this scale indicate the item means ranged from 2.23 to 3.60 for the 6 items, with a grand mean of 
2.91. When comparing this to the scale used in the survey with 1 being negative (strongly 
disagree) and 10 being positive (strongly agree), a grand mean of 2.91 suggests that pilots don’t 
perceive ramp security to be adequate (See Table E1—Ramp Security Means).  
Using the same analytic strategy as above, “flight-deck security” was determined to be 
the second most prominent perceived airline security factor among this group of pilots which 
explained 10.528% of the variance in the unrotated solution. Computation of the means (See 
Appendix F—Flight-Deck Security Means) revealed the item means ranged from 3.3742 to 
5.3890 with a grand mean of 4.266. This suggests that pilots perceive flight deck security to be 
only slightly better than ramp security.  
It is clear that ramp safety and flight deck security are the two most prominent factors 
constituting perceived airline security risk among pilots at American Airlines. More importantly, 
these pilots perceived these two dimensions as being inadequate to protect against future threats. 
An examination of the perceived adequacy of the remaining factors is also revealing. Passenger 
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and luggage screening item means ranged from 3.033 to 4.34. The grand means was 3.46. This 
suggests that pilots perceive ramp security, flight deck security, and passenger and luggage 
screening to be inadequate. 
The opposite is true for coproduction of safety, air marshal protection, and passenger 
profiling. In fact, the mean of items for the coproduction of safety ranged from 5.44 to 7.44 with 
a grand mean of 6.42, suggesting that pilots perceive this dimension of airline security to be 
adequate. Finally the grand mean for air marshal protection and passenger profiling were 7.64 
and 5.05, respectively. The results of this analysis suggest that of the 6 perceived risk factors 
constituting airline security, this group of pilots only perceived the coproduction of safety on 
flights and air marshal protection to be adequate, while perceptions regarding the remaining four 
dimensions were that of inadequacy.  
Interpretation of Pilots’ Perceived Threat 
The results of the analysis of perceived risk among pilots not only revealed the 
multidimensionality of the construct. In fact, perceived threat, as revealed by the factor analysis, 
suggests that it consists of ground security breach, screening breach, and in-flight takeover which 
explained 61.86% of the total variance in the unrotated solution. With respect to which 
dimension of perceived threat was most salient among the pilots, it was ground security breach 
as evidenced by an eigenvalue of 5.27, followed by screening breach and in-flight takeover.  
With respect to the perceived likelihood of threats occurring, the threat perceived to be 
most likely was a screening breach. In fact, the grand mean for this factor was 7.57 suggesting 
that these pilots agree with the prospect of future screening breaches. What is more, these pilots 
also agree with the possibility of a future ground security breach with a grand mean of 7.32. 
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Finally, these pilots are largely undecided with respect to the possibility of a future in-flight 
attack as revealed with a grand mean of 5.36.  
Correlation Analysis 
A Pearson’s correlation coefficient was analyzed for each factor in the scales generated 
for this study. The correlations were then formed into a correlation matrix (See Table 3). The 
Pearson r coefficient, which can range from –1 to +1, shows the linear relationship between two 
variables. A negative value indicates a negative relationship (i.e., as one variable increases the 
other variable decreases), while a positive value represents a positive linear relationship (i.e., as 
one variable increases the other variable increases as well). A Pearson r value of zero indicates 
no linear relationship between the two variables. Further, by squaring Pearson’s r, we can 
determine the proportion of variance shared by the two variables. 
 Of the 3 risk factors identified by Principal Axis factor analysis (Ground security breach, 
screening breach and in-flight takeover) in-flight takeover was evaluated to be the most 
meaningful dependent variable for interpretation. First, Zero-order correlations were obtained 
between all demographic and perceived risk variables. The only variable sharing a significant 
linear relationship with one’s perceived risk of an in-flight takeover was gender (p < .01). The 
results suggest that females are more likely to perceive a higher risk of an in-flight attack than 
males. The strength of that relationship for all intents of purpose is weak (r = -.115). Neither 
route (domestic vs. international) nor aircraft type (wide vs. narrow bodied) shared a significant 
linear relationship. This is surprising because wide bodied aircraft were deliberately targeted by 
the terrorists on 9/11 for their larger fuel capacity. What is more important, airport security 
abroad differs drastically from one country to another and a defining characteristic of terrorists 
groups is the ethnic delineation separating them from “Americans.” The increased proportion of 
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ethnic travels on flights originating from other countries would seem to theoretically increase 
risk perceptions.   
 Given this paucity of significant predictors of perceived risk of an in-flight takeover, 
correlation analysis was then used to examine the degree of the linear relationship between the 
six risk dimensions documented in this study. Not surprisingly, each of the six factors shared a 
statistically and substantively strong linear relationship with an individual’s perceived risk of an 
in-flight takeover to varying degrees. In other words, these six dimensions of airline security 
went much further in predicting perceived threat than did any of the demographic variables 
previously analyzed with considerable variability across the range of coefficients. The 
correlation coefficient obtained between ramp security and in-flight takeover was r =-.274. This 
suggests the strength between the two is modest and that individuals who perceive inadequate 
levels of ramp security are more likely to perceive a risk of an in-flight takeover. The same is 
true of flight-deck security, which had the strongest correlation coefficient (r = -.482). 
Interestingly, passenger and luggage screening and coproduction of in-flight safety had near 
identical coefficients r = -.228 and r = -.210, respectively.  
This is somewhat surprising given that the most attention by policymakers to increase 
airline security has focused on passenger and luggage screening while this other important 
dimension—and less costly option—has received scant attention. This suggests that the 
participants of this study felt that despite huge fiscal and human investment in screening 
passenger and luggage, it is only slightly more effective than flight attendants and passengers 
working together to identify and thwart any in-flight terror events. Air marshal and passenger 
profiling were also statistically (p < .01) and substantively significant where r = .157 and r = -
.170, respectively, and in the expected direction. 
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Table 3 
Correlations: 
 
 
Variable 
 
In-Flight Takeover
 
In-Flight Takeover 
 
1
Age 
 
                                      -.009
Gender 
 
-.115(**)
Aircraft Type 
 
                                       .034 
Route Type 
 
.063
Rank 
 
.003
Military Experience 
 
-.092*
Years at AA 
 
.048
Highest Level of Education 
 
-.031
Political Ideology 
 
-.033
Ramp Security 
 
-.274(**)
Flight Deck Security 
 
-.482(**)
Passenger and Luggage Screening 
 
-.228(**)
Co-production of In-flight Safety 
 
-.210(**)
Air Marshal Protection 
 
-.157(**)
Passenger Profiling 
 
-.170(**)
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Partial Correlation 
Given that some of the previously identified demographic variables (i.e., gender, military 
experience, type of aircraft, and route) either theoretically or empirically shared a significant 
linear relationship, partial correlation analysis was used to obtain fourth order correlation 
coefficient (i.e., partialling the influence of gender, route type, aircraft type, and military 
experience) to control for the potential confounding effects of these variables. The partial 
correlation matrix revealed a slight change in the coefficient for Ramp Security from r = -.274 to 
r = -.268, flight-deck security from r = -.482 to r = -.466, passenger and luggage screening from 
-.228 to -.225, and coproduction of in-flight safety remained the same where r = -.210. (See 
Table 4) 
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Table 4 
Partial Correlations:  
  
IFT 
 
RS FDS PLS CIS
 
AMP  PP
 
IFT 
 
---- 
 
-.268 -.466 -.225 -.210
 
-.130 -.164
RS -.268 ---- .553 .602 .181 .099 .278
FDS -.466 .553 ---- .486 .262 .261 .255
PLS -.225 .602 .486 ---- .257 .232 .424
CIS -.210 .181 .262 .257 ---- .337 .385
AMP -.130 .099 .261 .232 .337 ---- .238
PP -.164 .278 .255 .424 .385 .238 ----
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Control Variables are: gender, route type, aircraft type, and military experience. 
Note. IFT = in-flight takeover, RS = ramp security, FDS = flight deck security, PLS = passenger 
and luggage screening, CIS = coproduction of in flight safety, AMP = air marshal protection, PP 
= passenger profiling. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 The primary purpose of this exploratory study was to develop a reliable and valid scale 
by which perceptions of airline pilots can be measured against existing as well as new aviation 
security policies as they are implemented. Defining the threat of terrorism, discussing a 
theoretical cause of terrorism, the media’s impact on individuals’ perceptions, and existing 
emphasis on aviation security policy were all reviewed to add perspective and focus to the threat 
facing currently employed American Airline pilots. The researcher disseminated a self-report 
questionnaire designed to create a valid scale to measure risk and threat factors as perceived by 
rank and file pilots of American Airlines. In additions, demographic variables that could 
potentially have an influence on perceptions were included in the analysis. 
Methodology 
 The current study used a self-report questionnaire distributed to the entire population of 
currently employed American Airline pilots.  The researcher created scales for perceived threat 
and perceived risk factors using Principle Axis factor analysis.  The researcher identified six risk 
threat factors and three perceived threat factors for further analysis and interpretation.  
Correlation and partial correlation analysis were used to further refine and interpret the results of 
the newly developed perceived threat and risk factor scales.   
Findings 
Perceived Risk 
 Scale development using Principle Axis factor analysis resulted in six principle risk 
factors identified as: 1. Ramp Security, 2. Flight Deck Security, 3. Passenger and Luggage 
Screening, 4. Coproduction of In-Flight Safety, 5. Air Marshal Protection and 6. Passenger 
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Profiling. Of these six factors, ramp security was identified as the most salient risk perceived by 
pilots with an explained variance of 32.039%.  Ramp security includes any employee who works 
on or around the aircraft while it is at the gate including maintainers, baggage handlers, cleaning 
crews, and caterers.  Interestingly, none of these groups are made to proceed through traditional 
screening checkpoints even though pilots are required to.  This may be part of the reason pilots 
perceive ramp security to be so high a risk.  
To further interpret these risk factors the grand mean of each of the six factors was 
analyzed.  Ramp Security had a grand mean of 2.91 which, when interpreted against the survey 
scale of 1-10 with a 1 being negative and a 10 being positive, illustrated that pilots perceive ramp 
security to be highly inadequate.  The same is true of flight deck security (10.528 % total 
variance), which was the second most salient factor identified. Flight deck security includes the 
flight deck door itself as well as procedures used for in-flight opening and closing of the door 
(pilot may have to leave the flight deck during flight for physiological needs and flight attendants 
open it to pass food and drinks to the pilots) Flight deck security had a grand mean of 4.266, 
which is still in the “negative” range of the scales used, meaning pilots still viewed the security 
of the flight deck to still be inadequate. Of the six risk factors, ramp security and flight deck 
security were the two most prominent risk factors identified as inadequate to protect against 
future threats.  Passenger and luggage screening, which includes the security checkpoint so 
familiar to air travelers in a post-9/11 world, had a grand mean of 3.46 revealing a very negative 
impression of adequacy among pilots to go along with ramp security and flight deck security. 
Perhaps more revealing were the three remaining risk factors of coproduction of in-flight 
safety, air marshal protection and passenger profiling.  Coproduction of in-flight safety, which 
accounts for the combined actions of flight attendants and passengers in dealing with a threat, 
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had a grand mean of 6.42 suggesting a perception of adequacy.  This is not surprising when 
recalling the failed 9/11hijacking that crashed into a field in Pennsylvania.  It was the combined 
efforts of flight attendants and passengers that ultimately thwarted the terrorist’s intentions even 
though it was not a “formal” security tactic.  That “success” may well be why pilots view the 
coproduction of in-flight safety as positive or adequate.  Along that same logic, it stands to 
reason that air marshal protection (grand mean of 7.64) would be perceived as highly adequate as 
well. Air marshal manning numbers and flights assigned are kept secret for obvious security 
reasons; however, pilots feel having them onboard (or the threat of having them onboard) would 
contribute to lessening the risk of a terrorist incident.  Profiling, which involves identifying 
potential threats based solely on race, sex, or religion, had a grand mean of 5.05, revealing a 
neutral or undecided attitude among pilots.  That result is revealing from a sociological 
perspective because those who are most at risk from terrorists don’t necessarily feel profiling 
would be effective, despite the fact that all 19 hijackers on 9/11 were men of Middle Eastern 
descent.     
Of the six risk factors identified only coproduction of in-flight safety and air marshal 
protection were viewed as adequate.  The remaining four were viewed as inadequate, including 
flight-deck security.  Interestingly the flight deck doors of all airliners were upgrades in the 
months and years that followed the attacks of 9/11.  All of the time and money spent on those 
upgrades have failed to assuage the concerns of pilots concerning an in-flight cockpit breach.  
This is probably because the door is still opened and closed periodically during flight. Perhaps 
most disconcerting is the low confidence level pilots have with passenger and luggage screening.  
No other post-9/11 security change is as evident to the traveling public as passenger screening.  
A total of 4.7 billion dollars (Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 5) were spent during 
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fiscal year 2007 directly on aviation security matters of the Transportation Security Agency, 
whose main purpose is to screen all passengers and luggage for contraband that could be used in 
a terrorist event.  Despite this allocated money and man power, pilots still have exceedingly low 
confidence in the ability of the TSA to do their job effectively.  Additionally, despite this focus 
on screening, pilots still view ramp security and not passenger screening to be the most salient 
issue facing aviation security. This is not surprising considering ramp workers do not even 
undergo the same screening that pilots and passengers do, even though that screening has been 
deemed inadequate by this study.  That begs the question: If ramp workers are not receiving even 
cursory screening, then how safe can the ramp be?  The results of this research seem to support 
that concern. 
Perceived Threat 
 Principle Axis factor analysis revealed three perceived threats to airline security.  These 
included 1.Ground Security Breach, 2.Screening Breach and 3. In-Flight Takeover.  Ground 
Security Breach, which was determined to be most salient, is the threat of a person or persons 
breaching security and entering the ramp or perimeter of an airport in order to initiate a terror 
event.  The grand mean (7.32) corroborated this perception among pilots.  Despite the emphasis 
on screening since 9/11, the sheer volume of manpower and financial resources committed, 
Screening Breach had the highest grand mean of 7.57, indicating a very strong perception of 
threat among pilots.  In other words, pilots, who are required to undergo the same screening as 
passengers, perceive a screening breach to be the most likely threat facing the system.  This is 
shocking in light of the aforementioned resources allocated to closing the gaps in this vital 
security layer.  Pilots are in a unique position to observe screening because they have to undergo 
the process every time they go to work.  A typical month of flying may yield between 30 and 40 
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screenings, which lends a great deal of credibility to pilot’s perceptions in the matter.  The fact 
that they feel as though it is still such a high threat does not bode well for current screening 
policy.   
Risk of In-Flight Takeover 
 The result of 9/11 happened because one terrorist on each of three aircraft was able to 
enter the flight deck and secure it long enough to reach their objective.  As discussed earlier, the 
fourth aircraft crashed short of the objective due to a timely and brave passenger revolt.  
Ultimately, all security procedures are designed to keep would be hijackers out of the flight deck.  
Contrary to popular belief, the most destructive weapon on an aircraft is the controls.  With those 
a hijacker can turn the aircraft into a guided missile, which was illustrated all too well on 9/11.  
Because of these reasons, In-Flight Takeover was evaluated to be the most meaningful dependent 
variable for interpretation.   
 When demographics were measured against the risk of an in-flight takeover nothing other 
than gender was determined to be statistically significant.  For unexplained reasons, females 
were more likely to perceive the risk of an in-flight attack.  It is interesting that neither route 
flown nor aircraft type shared a significant relationship with in-flight takeover.  The type of 
routes flown are generally domestic (within the U.S., Canada, or Mexico), or international (all 
other destinations).  It was expected that perhaps perceptions of foreigners boarding aircraft or a 
lack of trust in foreign security at airports (they obviously vary by country), would have in 
impact on perceptions, but they did not.  The same goes for type of aircraft assigned, which is 
either narrowbody (MD-80, Boeing 737) or widebody (Boeing 757, 767, 777 and Airbus A-330).  
The 757 and 767 were the aircraft used in the attacks of 9/11 perhaps for the size and fuel load 
able to be carried.  It stands to reason that the larger the aircraft the greater the potential for 
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destruction.  Even so, no relationship was found, which reveals that pilots perceive all aircraft to 
be equally vulnerable to attack, not just the type used on 9/11.   
 Correlation analysis was also used to examine the linear relationship between the six risk 
dimensions previously cited.  The risk of ramp security and flight-deck security correlated the 
strongest with the threat of an in-flight takeover, which is not surprising.  Pilots obviously 
perceive a breach of ramp security or a less-than secure flight deck would greatly increase the 
threat of in in-flight takeover.  Breaching the ramp could lead to weapons or other contraband 
being placed onboard the aircraft, thus circumventing the screening process.  As previously 
mentioned, ramp workers are not required to undergo the same screening that passengers and 
pilots are required to.  Each airport is different; however, many simply require the flash of a line 
badge to gain access to the ramp. Also, tailgating, or following a fellow worker through a secure 
door, is a potential problem that may be accounting for pilot’s perceptions in this area.   
Perhaps the most revealing result of this research was the correlations between passenger 
and luggage screening, coproduction of in-flight safety, and the threat of an in-flight takeover.  
Many times throughout this paper passenger and luggage screening, as a front-line security 
policy, has been highlighted and examined.  The Transportation Security Administration or TSA 
was mandated with assuming all screening functions following the failures of 9/11.  Huge 
amounts of resources were poured into the nascent agency in the hope of deterring future terror 
events.  Screening is looked at as the last line of defense from keeping a would-be terrorist off an 
aircraft, and as such is certainly the most visible to the traveling public.  Numerous GAO studies 
have concluded that screening breaches still occur, despite this massive government investment.  
As such, it is understandable that pilots perceive and correlate a screening breach so strongly 
with the threat of an in-flight takeover.    
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What is most revealing, however, is that the coproduction of in-flight safety correlates 
nearly the same as passenger and luggage screening to the threat of an in-flight takeover.  This 
telling statistic potentially highlights an area that has been left untapped when formulating 
security policy.  Consider the example of the 9/11 crash of United Airlines flight 93. The 
coproduction of in-flight safety, or in this case the teaming of passengers and flight attendants to 
counteract a terrorist event, has largely been ignored as an effective counter terrorism strategy, 
despite the fact is essentially has a 100% “success” rate (success defined as countering the 
ultimate intentions of the hijackers)..  Flight attendants can ask passenger to help assist them as a 
part of airline policy, but only after an event has occurred. Consider that passengers who sit in an 
emergency exit row are briefed by flight attendants on the exits operation and when to use it. 
Passenger lives are at stake if passengers fail to execute their responsibilities.  No such prior 
coordination exists with a potential terrorist event.  No announcements on what to do if someone 
attempts to takeover the aircraft, how to assist flight attendants and when, whether or not to stay 
seated or help block the flight deck, nor any other contingencies.  Perhaps passengers could be 
encouraged to report certain behaviors that may be deemed suspicious.  At any rate, the 
coproduction of in-flight safety clearly a powerful counter-terrorist force as evidenced by the 
taking back of United Airlines flight 93 by passengers and flight attendants.   
Limitations 
 A study of this magnitude and ambition is not without limitations.  The decision was 
made, due to time and budget constraints, to make the survey available to all currently employed 
pilots of American Airlines.  This precluded the necessity for a random sample, thus greatly 
simplifying the process of gathering data.  It was hoped that enough respondents would 
participate; however, that was not the case, resulting in a low response rate of (8.05%) when 
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factoring the population number of 8,169 pilots.  With that being said, however, the researcher is 
confident that a representative sample was achieved considering some of the actual 
demographics closely matching the respondent’s demographics.  For instance, DFW had the 
highest response rate of 26.8% while having an actual rate of 24.4% of pilots at American 
Airlines.  Additionally, the breakdown of respondents was 53.7% first officer and 46.3% captain, 
which compares closely with the actual rate of 53.3% and 46.7% respectively.  Finally, those 
who reported flying international routes (41%) and domestic routes (59%) again compared 
closely with the actual rate of 45.2% and 54.8% respectively.  
 An additional limitation was that survey participation depended on logging in to the APA 
website.  This presupposes that potential respondents log in on a somewhat regular basis given 
the survey ran for 10 days.  Even if they did, they would then have to identify the survey and 
navigate to its page. Potential respondents may start to take the survey and grow tired after some 
questions and not pay as close attention to the remaining questions.  The initial e-mail blast 
announcing the survey may have been discarded by potential respondents.   
 One final limitation is that this survey was conducted at a single airline, albeit America’s 
largest.  The perceptions of varying demographics at other airlines, including smaller “regional” 
airlines, could potentially vary from the perceptions discovered in this research.  Any future 
research should ideally account for the above limitations. 
Implications 
 These findings suggest that local knowledge and perceptions of pilots have largely been 
ignored in the formulation of aviation security policy.  The juxtaposition of existing policy with 
the perceptions of what pilots identify as significant threats and risks facing the aviation system 
appear to be at odds.  These finding seem to give credence to the concept of mētis as a valuable 
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contributor in the formulation of public policy, most especially aviation policy.  The local 
knowledge of pilots can only be obtained through years of experience in the field and on the job.  
Moreover, this knowledge can not be obtained through reports or briefings; therefore, it is 
imperative it be used in the crafting of effective policy.   
 This study did provide important contributions to the existing literature regarding pilot 
perceptions of security risks and threats confronting the U.S. aviation system. As of the writing 
of this paper, no other significant survey of its kind has been found to exist.  Therefore, these 
scales are a potentially valuable contributor for policymakers to consider before developing 
future aviation security policy. 
Future Research 
 In the current exploratory study the perceptions of airline pilots employed at American 
Airlines were measured, analyzed, and compared to existing aviation policy.  The central thesis 
highlighted the need for mētis or local knowledge to be considered when formulating security 
policy.  Too often this local knowledge is overlooked in policy making, to the detriment of 
effective policy.   
Future studies could apply the scales in this study to other airlines such as Delta, United, 
and Southwest.  Additionally, smaller airlines such as American Eagle, Comair, and Air Tran 
could be considered as well.  Additionally, any future research should include the perceptions of 
flight attendants, considering they are integral cogs in the defense of potential in-flight takeover 
attempts.  Also, flight attendants are subjected to the same screening procedures and security that 
pilots are exposed to; therefore, their perceptions in those areas could be enlightening.  
 One important change to any additional studies would be to change the sampling methods 
from surveying the entire universe as the current study did, to a more traditional sample of the 
 69
universe.  Even though confidence is high that a representative sample was obtained in this 
study, a more sound sampling method should provide greater statistical validity and reliability. 
These suggestions for future research were beyond the scope of the present study; however, if 
incorporated; they would add a dimension of refinement to a potentially valuable tool for the 
implementation of sound public policy. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Perceived Risk Factor Analysis 
Table A1  
 Perceived risk factor total variance explained  
Factor Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings(a) 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 8.650 32.039 32.039 8.253 30.567 30.567 6.749
2 2.843 10.528 42.567 2.441 9.042 39.608 6.073
3 1.752 6.489 49.056 1.379 5.106 44.714 5.928
4 1.408 5.216 54.273 .957 3.545 48.259 3.210
5 1.247 4.620 58.893 .878 3.254 51.513 2.071
6 1.159 4.292 63.185 .650 2.408 53.921 2.422
7 1.037 3.839 67.024 .522 1.932 55.853 3.045
8 .845 3.128 70.152     
9 .772 2.859 73.012     
10 .702 2.601 75.612     
11 .675 2.501 78.113     
12 .625 2.314 80.427     
13 .594 2.198 82.625     
14 .547 2.026 84.651     
15 .476 1.763 86.414     
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Factor Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings(a) 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
16 .454 1.680 88.094     
17 .441 1.635 89.729     
18 .385 1.425 91.153     
19 .346 1.280 92.433     
20 .337 1.250 93.683     
21 .329 1.219 94.902     
22 .303 1.121 96.023     
23 .266 .984 97.007     
24 .249 .922 97.928     
25 .213 .790 98.718     
26 .194 .717 99.435     
27 .152 .565 100.000     
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 Table A2  
Perceived risk factor loading pattern matrix 
 Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c35 1.013 .022 -.222 .017 .015 .079 -.033 
c32 .862 .000 -.178 .012 .004 .121 .020 
c18 .853 .095 -.075 -.021 .055 .008 -.060 
c26 .691 -.016 .190 -.060 .017 -.109 -.001 
c22 .603 .004 .342 -.071 -.039 -.160 .021 
c29 .460 -.132 .066 .148 .064 -.027 .207 
c20 .098 .920 -.103 -.020 .013 .043 -.095 
c16 .096 .816 -.034 -.057 .005 .066 -.066 
c24 -.009 .764 -.087 -.027 .067 .000 .103 
c12 -.110 .727 .130 .084 .005 -.082 -.083 
c21 .038 .440 .098 -.034 -.140 .024 .244 
c15 -.030 -.057 .822 -.048 .089 .159 -.097 
c11 -.136 -.025 .596 -.014 .056 .128 -.028 
c14 .353 .028 .515 .053 -.104 -.127 -.016 
c19 .129 .075 .490 -.032 .072 .116 -.014 
c27 .230 .055 .353 -.050 -.031 .046 .214 
c13 .054 .339 .346 .207 -.038 -.095 -.064 
c34 -.005 -.078 -.008 .842 .018 .011 -.062 
c37 .145 -.022 .058 .659 -.082 .143 -.102 
c28 -.004 .026 -.052 .598 .023 -.026 .121 
c31 -.191 .173 -.092 .470 .097 -.043 .186 
c17 .054 -.033 .077 .009 .864 .009 -.020 
c25 .010 .062 .082 .021 .760 -.065 .028 
c36 -.041 .029 .179 .047 -.054 .761 -.004 
c33 .050 -.017 .160 .018 .003 .701 .067 
c23 -.033 .022 .020 -.070 .035 .117 .524 
c30 .075 -.091 -.140 .111 -.016 -.033 .514 
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Figure A1. Scree plot  
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APPENDIX B 
Perceived Threat Factor Analysis 
Table B1  
Perceived threat factor total variance explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings(a) 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 5.267 40.513 40.513 5.267 40.513 40.513 4.890 
2 1.655 12.733 53.245 1.655 12.733 53.245 2.590 
3 1.120 8.617 61.862 1.120 8.617 61.862 3.307 
4 .994 7.647 69.509      
5 .799 6.149 75.657      
6 .647 4.977 80.634      
7 .570 4.388 85.022      
8 .534 4.109 89.130      
9 .421 3.241 92.371      
10 .337 2.590 94.961      
11 .267 2.056 97.016      
12 .261 2.005 99.021      
13 .127 .979 100.000      
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Table B2 
Perceived threat factor loading pattern matrix 
 
 
 Component 
  1 2 3 
c50 .887 -.081 -.136
c48 .876 .057 -.157
c49 .818 -.169 -.100
c40 .709 .244 -.097
c41 .535 .024 .238
c47 .516 -.097 .322
c42 .493 .101 .305
c44 .438 .375 .055
c38 -.091 .932 .006
c39 .014 .900 .002
c45 .099 -.057 .863
c46 .158 -.034 .836
c43 .449 -.123 -.534
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Figure B1. Perceived threat factor analysis scree plot  
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APPENDIX C 
Reliability Analysis of Perceived Risk (Independent Variable) Scales 
Scale: Ramp Security 
 
Table C1  
Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 I 
 
 
Table C2  
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c35 15.5545 67.255 .761 .824 
c32 15.5801 69.352 .685 .837 
c18 15.7372 68.021 .756 .825 
c26 15.9808 68.433 .718 .831 
c22 16.4038 70.845 .720 .833 
c24 13.8365 71.659 .417 .897 
 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.864 6  
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Scale: Flight Deck Security 
Table C3  
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.865 5 
 
Table C4  
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c20 17.1345 70.053 .809 .806
c16 17.8038 70.735 .762 .818
c24 16.5491 74.166 .696 .835
c12 15.9604 72.811 .641 .851
c21 17.9826 84.737 .538 .870
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Scale: Passenger and Luggage Screening 
Table C5  
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.740 4 
 
Table C6  
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c15 10.6992 25.842 .615 .640
c11 9.5056 25.048 .433 .748
c19 10.4832 24.648 .592 .646
c27 10.8128 26.252 .517 .689
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Scale: Coproduction of In-flight Safety 
Table C7  
Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C8  
Item-Total Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.756 4 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c34 18.4105 26.665 .653 .645
c37 20.1390 26.683 .531 .713
c28 20.2093 26.348 .567 .692
c31 18.2204 31.257 .474 .739
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Scale: Air Marshal Protection 
 
Table C9  
Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C10  
Item-Total Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.810 2 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c17 7.3227 5.146 .688 .(a) 
c25 7.9475 3.897 .688 .(a) 
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Scale: Passenger Profiling 
 
Table C11  
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.819 2 
 
Table C12  
Item-Total Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c36 5.1799 5.472 .696 .(a) 
c33 4.9283 4.650 .696 .(a) 
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APPENDIX D 
Reliability Analysis of Perceived Threat (Dependent Variable) Scales 
Scale: Ground Security Breach 
Table D1  
Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Table D2  
Item-Total Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.853 7 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c50 43.3942 106.496 .663 .827 
c48 43.7580 104.948 .697 .823 
c49 43.8686 105.623 .561 .841 
c40 43.7933 103.789 .654 .827 
c41 44.3702 101.277 .597 .836
c47 45.2324 103.742 .553 .843
c42 43.6218 103.471 .617 .832
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Scale: Screening Breach 
Table D3  
Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D4  
Item-Total Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.831 2 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c38 7.7528 5.111 .721 .(a) 
c39 7.3906 7.122 .721 .(a) 
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Scale: In-flight Takeover 
Table D5  
Reliability Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D6 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
 
 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of 
Items 
.926 2 
 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
c45 5.5079 6.781 .862 .(a) 
c46 5.2333 6.736 .862 .(a) 
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APPENDIX E 
Means Analysis of Perceived Threat Scales 
Table E1  
Factor 1 Means (Ramp Security) 
  c35 c32 c18 c26 c22 c29 
N Valid 632 630 635 633 635 634
  Missing 8 10 5 7 5 6
Mean 3.0633 3.0492 2.8945 2.6493 2.2252 3.5962
Std. Deviation 2.04833 2.06395 2.02349 2.07003 1.89254 2.10717
 
Table E2  
Factor 2 Means (Flight-Deck Security) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 c20 c16 c24 c12 c21 
N Valid 637 635 637 635 636 
  Missing 3 5 3 5 4 
Mean 4.2214 3.5543 4.8006 5.3890 3.3742 
Std. Deviation 2.62840 2.69679 2.62477 2.88062 2.28274 
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Table E3  
Factor 3 Means (Passenger and Luggage Screening) 
  c15 c11 c19 c27 
Valid 631 634 636 633N 
Missing 9 6 4 7
Mean 3.1315 4.3375 3.3475 3.0237
Std. Deviation 1.93386 2.44037 2.12307 2.08545
 
Table E4  
Factor 4 Means (Coproduction of In-Flight Security) 
  c34 c37 c28 c31 
Valid 633 634 635 635N 
Missing 7 6 5 5
Mean 7.2559 5.5473 5.4394 7.4362
Std. Deviation 2.13490 2.39967 2.36710 1.98025
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Table E5  
Factor 5 Means (Air Marshal Protection) 
  c17 c25 
Valid 633 633N 
Missing 7 7
Mean 7.9573 7.3175
Std. Deviation 1.97205 2.27228
 
Table E6  
Factor 6 Means (Passenger Profiling) 
  c33 c36 
N Valid 631 632
  Missing 9 8
Mean 5.1823 4.9225
Std. Deviation 2.34488 2.15604
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APPENDIX F 
Means Analysis of Perceived Risk Scales 
Table F1  
Factor 1 Means (Ground Security Breach) 
  c50 c48 c49 c40 c41 c47 c42 
N Valid 634 633 633 635 631 634 635
  Missing 6 7 7 5 9 6 5
Mean 7.9211 7.5592 7.4581 7.5370 6.9540 6.0946 7.6835
Std. Deviation 2.05149 2.06080 2.36307 2.22825 2.55531 2.52267 2.35942
 
Table F2  
Factor 2 Means (Screening Breach) 
  c38 c39 
Valid 636 636N 
Missing 4 4
Mean 7.3836 7.7516
Std. Deviation 2.67222 2.25910
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Table F3  
Factor 3 Means (In-flight Takeover) 
  c45 c46 
Valid 634 631N 
Missing 6 9
Mean 5.2208 5.5151
Std. Deviation 2.59574 2.60817
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APPENDIX G 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Section I 
Please answer each question by marking the appropriate response or filling in the blank space 
provided 
 
What is your current age in years? 
 
 
What is your gender? 
 
 Male   Female 
 
What is your current crew base? 
 
 New York    Miami    L.A.    Dallas    Washington  
 
 Boston   San Fran   St. Louis    Chicago  Other 
 
Do you currently fly narrowbody or widebody? 
 
 Narrowbody      Widebody 
Do you currently fly domestic or international? 
 
 Domestic       International 
Are you currently a Captain or First Officer?  
 
 Captain          First Officer 
Are you a former military pilot?   
 
Yes     No 
 
How many total years have you been flying for American Airlines? 
 
 
What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? 
 
 High School   2 year college degree   4 year college degree   
 
 Some graduate  Graduate degree 
 
How would you describe your political affiliation? 
 
 Very Liberal   Liberal  Moderate  Conservative  Very Conservative  Other 
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Section II 
 
Indicate how strongly you Agree or Disagree with the following statements by clicking the 
number that best represents your opinion. For example, if you Strongly Disagree with a 
statement you would check 1, and if you Strongly Agree with a statement, you would check 10.  
 
1. Strongly Disagree                                      10. Strongly Agree 
 
TSA screeners who do not perform adequately will be disciplined. 
 
   1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Flight deck doors are adequately reinforced to prevent unauthorized entry. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Flight Attendants are adequately trained to handle terror events. 
 
   1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Ramp workers receive adequate background checks. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
TSA screeners are adequately trained to identify individuals who pose a threat to aircraft security. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
I am confident that no unauthorized individuals can enter the flight deck. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Air Marshals are adequately trained to deal with threats to aircraft security. 
 
SD                                      SA 
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PAGE 3 
 
Unattended aircraft are adequately secured 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
TSA screening checkpoints are effective in identifying items that my be used to compromise aircraft security. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
The flight-deck is adequately secured from unauthorized access. 
     
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
There are a sufficient number of Air Marshal’s to deter in-flight terrorist attacks. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Ramp workers are effectively screened prior to entering the ramp. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
TSA screening procedures are uniformly applied to all persons regardless of an individual’s racial demographics. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Current policies regarding aircrew flight deck entry and exit are sufficient to prevent unauthorized access. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
I feel confident of an Air Marshal’s ability to handle a terrorist event in flight. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
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PAGE 4 
Ramp worker entry points employ adequate screening procedures. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
The TSA adequately screens all baggage. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Passengers actively look for suspicious behavior. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Ramp personnel follow security challenge procedures when credentials aren’t displayed. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Children are subject to the same search criteria as adults. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Passengers are likely to intervene in threats to aircraft security. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Aircraft cargo doors are secure when the aircraft is left unattended. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Individuals displaying suspicious behavior receive increased screening. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Flight Attendants actively look for suspicious behavior. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
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Unattended aircraft are secured sufficiently to prevent unauthorized entry. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Individuals acting nervous are more carefully screened than those who appear calm. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Flight Attendants actively look for contraband that may be used to compromise in-flight security. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Weapons will likely be brought through security checkpoints in the future. 
     
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Contraband that could be used to compromise aircraft security passes through screening checkpoints 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Terrorists will likely penetrate an airport perimeter in order to carry out a terror event sometime in the near future. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
I believe a missile attack against a U.S. commercial aircraft will happen sometime in the near future.  
     
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
I believe there will be another terrorist attack onboard a U.S. commercial aircraft sometime in the next five years     
     
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
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Air Marshal’s are able to prevent threats to aircraft security.    
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Baggage containing explosives will eventually get through screening checkpoints.     
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Terrorists will gain control over an in-flight aircraft in the near future.     
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Terrorists will find a way to gain access to the flight-deck, while in-flight, sometime in the near future.     
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Terrorists will pose as flight personnel to gain access to aircraft in the near future 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
  
Terrorists will target airport perimeters to compromise aircraft security     
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
     
Terrorists will likely corrupt airline ground personnel into carrying out their directives. 
 
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10 
SD                                      SA 
 
Terrorists will attempt to compromise aircraft security by securing positions as legitimate airline employees.  
 
SD                                      SA 
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